

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. 2. No. 13.]

London, Saturday, 2d October, 1802.

[Price 10D

CONTENTS.—Notes on Belsham, 385. Mr. Cobbett's Let. to Ld. Hawkesbury, 393. Caractacus on the Aff. of Germany, 399. Disp. at Ratisbon, 403. Civil War in Switz., 404. Capit. bet. the Porte and P. Oglou, 405. Voy. of the K. of Etruria, 405. Ship-Owners, 406. Dam. by Fire at Liverpool, 407. Lon. Sheriffs, 407. Sum. of Pol. 411.

385]

[386

NOTES ON MR. BELSHAM'S REMARKS.

(Continued from p. 295, and concluded.)

More trifling trash, under the pretence of political reasoning, was never offered to the public eye, than is gravely set forth in this obvious answer, to which the reply is not less obvious, and (we trust) much more convincing. It is *not* "as much the interest of the King of Naples to keep on terms of amity with Great-Britain as with France," because his danger from the one power is not so immediate as from the other. Whenever the French shall perceive the approach of war, their ministers will have only to signify to the King of Naples, that hostilities being about to commence with Great-Britain, the possession of Malta is necessary to the military operations of the republic; which will immediately send four thousand troops to relieve the Neapolitan garrison during the war; that if his Majesty accedes to this proposal, he shall have the liberty of remaining neuter; otherwise the army of the Italian Republic will immediately proceed to Naples. Can it be expected that the King of Naples will hesitate a moment between this alternative? The attempt and effect will be the same thing, and a light squadron from Toulon will have completed the business, before our Mediterranean fleet (if we should have one there) could have orders to make any opposition. It would even be a cruel insult to urge the King of Naples to refuse the neutrality: for although our fleet might perhaps, six months after the evacuation of Malta, find means to destroy the city of Naples; yet we could never prevent the whole kingdom being at the absolute disposal of the French. That we have no evidence to warrant a supposition that France may take such a step is assertion against experience; and can only be laughed at by those who recollect, under what professions of peace and proclamations of good will and respect for lives, laws, and property, the French attacked and plundered Venice, Switzerland, Egypt, and the Pope's dominions. France can have no motive to make an attempt on Malta, until she shall be pre-

pared for and most likely shall have provoked a renewal of the war; consequently no fear of incurring the risk or certainty of a war will deter her. And as for the disgrace, she will have anticipated a sufficient compensation for it in the advantage of commanding all the coasts of Italy and the Levant.

Page 15. Mr. B. says, that "it has been insinuated rather than alleged, that England ought to have prevented the transfer of Porto Ferrajo and the Isle of Elba, in which it is situated, to France." But Mr. B. adds, "in this arrangement England had no pretence founded either in policy or justice to interfere." It has been proved by experience, that Porto Ferrajo is a secure harbour for our ships, and so situated as to enable its possessor effectually to check the communication, and of course the commerce and naval operations of an enemy, on a great length of the Italian coast, viz. from Genoa quite down to Naples and Sicily. It therefore seems clear, that it would have been very good policy in England to have interfered, if her interference could have prevented a place of such importance from being for ever secured to France; experience having also shewn, that it is almost impregnable. But this is only one of many instances of Mr. B. making a positive assertion, without offering any proof, and indeed without appearing to have at all considered the subject. With respect to the justice of such interference on the part of England, her right of doing so has already been discussed in the remarks on the cession of Guiana.

Page 19. "It is alleged, that the First Consul of the French Republic having, pending the negotiation, and after signing the preliminaries, caused himself to be elected President of the Italian Republic, this was a sufficient ground for breaking off the treaty altogether; or at least for insisting upon an equivalent for the advantage thus accruing to France."—"But (answers Mr. B.) that this equivalent, had it been demanded, would have been peremptorily refused, cannot be doubted. And we must either have receded from our

"demand, or have renewed the war in consequence of such refusal, &c. &c." And Mr. B. adds, "Austria, Russia, and Prussia acquiesced in this nomination." It was more than once said in the House of Commons, that all the different steps of aggrandizement (but not this election alone) taken by Buonaparté subsequent to the signature of the preliminaries, were a sufficient cause for renewing the war, unless England should acquire by the definitive treaty some advantages to counterbalance the increasing power of France; and this election seemed to be the most promising opportunity of urging the demand for an equivalent. Because, notwithstanding Mr. B.'s assertion, that Austria, Russia, and Prussia acquiesced, it is far from certain, that their acquiescence did not in some degree proceed from the apparent supineness or timidity of the English government. It was even confidently reported on the Continent, that Austria had shewn strong marks of jealousy at this newly conferred dignity; and what might be more alarming to the First Consul, there appeared in Paris and other parts of France many symptoms of dissatisfaction at his having thus *caused himself* to be elected to a *foreign* sovereignty, which had certainly an appearance of providing against the worst. Now, had our government made an immediate and spirited demand of some melioration of the preliminaries, it may be *reasonably doubted* if under these circumstances the refusal would have been so peremptory as Mr. B. asserts. And the First Consul might have felt it to be not altogether prudent or safe to force the French, who were at that time more anxious (as indeed they might well be) for a definitive peace than we were—into a renewal of the war, merely to secure to his person the sovereignty of the Italian Republic.

Page 21. "It has been objected, that it is highly culpable (in the ministry) to have suffered the cession of Louisiana to France."—"But (adds Mr. B.) the question again occurs—how could we prevent this cession?"—By the only way in which one independent power can prevent or resist the injurious conduct of another: by England formally notifying that she would not permit France to have possession of Louisiana; and if France should persist, by declaring war.—What! (would Mr. B. say) go to war to prevent France having Louisiana?—No, not for this or perhaps any other object of the treaty *separately* taken: but to prevent France acquiring collectively Louisiana, Guiana, &c. and the sovereignty of

the Italian Republic, it might have been worth our while to have once more tried the fortune of war, whilst as yet none of the cessions or restitutions had taken place. "As to the danger which the United States of America are supposed to incur from the neighbourhood of France, those states are unquestionably well able to defend themselves."—So far otherwise, that divided as they are in interests, opinions, and situation, few things seem more questionable than their ability of maintaining their independence against the arms and more dangerous artifices of a powerful and intriguing neighbour, situated close upon their frontier, and notoriously possessing a decided influence over the party and persons who at present have the administration of their government.

"The vicinity of France would only tend to incline them (the Americans) the more strongly to the alliance of Britain."—Admitting this, America may not have an opportunity or may not dare to pursue this inclination. England too may have her reasons for not entering into the alliance at the time it may be proposed: and without following this speculation further, it cannot be denied that from the present appearance of affairs in that country, France seems to have a much fairer prospect of revolutionizing America, than England has of preventing it.

The omission of the renewal of former treaties, Mr. B.'s only defence is an extract from Lord Hawkesbury's excellent speech on the thirteenth of May: which excellent as it may be, Mr. B. has thought proper to bolster up by adding that—"a commercial negotiation is on foot, from which the most happy and beneficial consequences may be reasonably expected."

As for "the most happy and beneficial consequences of the commercial negotiation,"—if (as Mr. B. promises) they may be very *reasonably* expected, it is also certain that they have long been and may still be very fruitlessly expected. When Mr. B. told his readers, that if we had refused to restore the Cape of Good Hope we could have had no peace; if we had demanded any equivalent for the First Consul's causing himself to be elected President of the Italian Republic, it would without doubt have been peremptorily refused; if we had opposed the cessions of Elba or Louisiana, we must have renewed the war; he spoke with the authority of a man, who had been admitted into all the secrets of all the cabinets. But Mr. B. seems to have been



kept quite in the dark as to this commercial negociation; although he has ventured to predict these *most happy and beneficial consequences*. And in truth if the benefit (whenever we get it) should bear a fit proportion to the delay and difficulty in obtaining it, his prediction will be most satisfactorily fulfilled. Meanwhile Mr. B. himself must confess that, as far as this commercial treaty is to correct the inconveniences of the non-renewal of former treaties, those inconveniences do for the present remain uncorrected.—P. 24. “Up-
 “on the whole it is *evident to demonstration*,
 “that the nation is under the highest obligation to those ministers who, entering
 “into a negotiation in the true spirit of conciliation, have with such wisdom, firm-
 “ness and moderation brought to a felicitous conclusion a treaty attended with such
 “numerous and complicated difficulties.”—
 Having stated the substance of Mr. B’s remarks and offered the foregoing observations on them, my readers must judge how far Mr. B. merits this joint compliment which he pays to himself for his *evident demonstration*, and to the ministry for their wisdom, firmness, and moderation. If the cause were capable of evident demonstration, most assuredly Mr. B’s remarks have rather darkened than illustrated it. Nor could this be otherwise: Mr. B. having forgotten to establish two points on which, as on first principles, all his assertions and arguments rest; namely, the indispensable necessity of an immediate peace, or a very great improbability of obtaining better terms by a continuance of the war. For it cannot have escaped the reader’s notice, that whether Mr. B. discusses the several restitutions, cessions, or objections, his most favourite arguments are—“If we
 “had not restored this place, we could
 “have had no peace”—“If we had insisted on that demand, we must have
 “continued the war.”—But this mode of reasoning, or rather of asserting, leads to no conclusion, unless we were so completely disabled from accepting these threatened alternatives, that peace was become indispensably necessary. But Mr. B. has not said that the peace was a measure of necessity, and Mr. Addington has expressly denied it. If therefore it be “evidently
 “demonstrated that the nation is under
 “the highest obligations to the ministers
 “for the felicitous conclusion of the
 “treaty,” (of which the nation does not at present seem at all conscious) it must be a *self-evident demonstration*; since Mr.

B. so far from producing any thing like *demonstration*, has not even produced the premises from which he principally draws all his conclusions.

The pamphlet is eked out with several more pages, containing threadbare and long refuted arguments against the necessity of the war, violent accusations against the late ministry, and warm panegyrics of Messrs. Fox, Addington, and above all, Mr. B’s favourite hero and statesman Buonaparté. These topics, having no connexion with the articles of the definitive treaty, may well be dismissed without further notice.

Mr. B. concludes with a very compendious view of the state of Europe, in which there are two passages which require to be briefly considered.

Page 37. “Notwithstanding the vast territorial acquisitions of France, the other principal powers of Europe have experienced *no diminution* of their former greatness.”

If “greatness” means mere extent of territory, this may possibly be true; but in whatever else constitutes the greatness of a nation, Spain, Prussia, and Austria have experienced a very obvious and dangerous diminution. Spain, notwithstanding that the vices of her government had for many years progressively impaired her efficient strength, was previous to the war still respected as one of the principal powers of Europe; the “*magni nominis umbra*” afforded a becoming shelter to her declining dignity. But the French first conquered and then unfeelingly uncovered all her weakness.—It would be ungenerous to dwell on the particular instances of her humiliation.—The basis of all national greatness is independence, secured by the power of resenting with reasonable probability of success any injury, or of resisting any attack which may be made by any other nation: extent of territory, fertility of soil, the happy cultivation of arts, sciences, and commerce may add a splendid superstructure; but a secure independence must be the foundation. Apply this position to the relative situation of Austria and Prussia with France. Before the war their German dominions were secured by wide intervening tracts of country, presenting against any attack from France a strong frontier, formed by the Alps and the Rhine, over which river all the principal passages were commanded by places of great strength. This whole frontier is now in the hands of France. Piedmont is a

French department: Switzerland is governed by a French army: the left bank of the Rhine, with all the strong places on that side, annexed to France: on the right bank, all the places, capable of opposing the passage of an army, completely dismantled: thus, in a word, the entrance into any part of the Germanic territory is laid as freely open to the generals, as its constitution has been to the ministers of France. All human affairs are liable to change. The French Colossus may fall by its own weight; or the European Princes may at last feel the necessity of making one hearty attempt to destroy a power, which will naturally (for such is the nature of power) exert itself for its own aggrandizement: but this was the situation of Austria and Prussia at the conclusion of the war; and nothing but this helpless situation could have produced the edict of indemnifications lately issued by France and Russia; which has regulated the German empire with as little ceremony, as Tuscany, Sardinia, Switzerland, and Holland had before been regulated by the First Consul. Yet Mr. Belsham gravely tells us, that "Austria and Prussia have experienced no diminution of their former greatness." Would that this assertion were correct even with respect to England! But when we see the Austrian Netherlands annexed to France, and the resources of the United Provinces placed at the absolute disposal of the French government; and when we must acknowledge that all our statesmen have ever held the perfect independence and security of the United Provinces against France to be a necessary point of defence to our naval power and commercial operations; it would be wilful presumption to say that our security, that is, the basis of our greatness, is not in a fearful degree impaired. We may, indeed, find some consolation in Mr. B.'s remark (p. 37) that "the naval preponderancy of these islands has kept pace with the military preponderancy of France."—And true it is, that the unparalleled skill and valour of our many gallant commanders had, to their immortal honour, obtained for their country a *decided* superiority over all the maritime powers in Europe, *at the end of the war*. But at the beginning of another war this naval superiority must be again fought for and again decided. And whoever considers that Spain was our ally at the commencement of the late war, and that Holland did not act against us until half of her fleet had declared for the Prince of Orange, both which powers must here-

after fully co-operate with France; that the victory of Aboukir was not less wonderfully fortunate than glorious; and that the Danes may be taught to form a line of defence too strong for even Lord Nelson to force; whoever (I say) gives due attention to these extraordinary circumstances and events, may reasonably doubt if the naval preponderancy of England be nearly *so secure* or likely to be *as permanent* as the military preponderancy of France.

To conclude.—Since it is but too evident that our enemy has made great and formidable additions to his means of attack, and that we have made no addition to our means of defence, not that I mean to undervalue the acquisition of Ceylon, but the danger lies nearer home—it follows that we must engage in any future contest with France under circumstances of disadvantage, very different from what we have ever before experienced: unless we should lessen this alarming difference by an increase of activity, vigilance and public spirit. Our activity must be shewn by maintaining a very strong peace establishment, completely efficient, strictly disciplined, and always fit for immediate service. The expense will be heavy, but we must learn to bear the burden, and let us do it without grudging or grumbling: it is a fine we ought to pay for having preferred an insecure state of equivocal peace to a secure state of successful war; I say, "a secure state"—because, at the very time when the preliminaries were signed, very few thinking men feared any thing from a continuance of the war, but a continuance of the expense. Vigilance must be shewn by our ministers in a close attention to the proceedings of the French government, and by opposing at all events any measures of further aggrandizement, whether by *voluntary* cession (as it may be called) or by open force and encroachment. Should France take umbrage (as it may possibly happen) at such interference, our answer should be not petulant, but firm; and this firmness of language should receive weight from an immediate addition to our military force. Such should be the conduct and declared disposition of our ministers: if those, who are now at the helm, should shew themselves unequal to the arduous task, let them quit or be forced from their situations. A Fleury or a Pelham could not serve this country in times like these: the intrepid and active genius of Alberoni did indeed ruin Spain; but an English Alberoni would have different materials to work with, more enlightened assistants, and

more wholesome restraints. Our public spirit must be revived by every honest man exerting his best talents and influence in decrying that baleful and abject opinion—that war is an evil of such inhuman and extensive magnitude, that no sacrifices can be too great to avoid it. But this is the pitiful cant of cowardly luxury, hypocritical selfishness, or democratical disaffection. Between war and peace abstractedly considered there can be no comparison of good and evil: but human affairs cannot be conducted upon abstract principles; war cannot be avoided; it is a temporary evil incident to the state of man in this world, the conflict between injurious violence and justifiable self-defence: and the nation, which is apparently unable or unwilling to meet his enemy in the field, must soon submit to be oppressed and plundered by him as his slave. Above all, let us not be lulled into security by professions of amicable dispositions and a conciliating spirit: for among nations, especially rival nations, there exists no amicable dispositions, but what depend upon interest; no conciliating spirit, but what arises from the fear of attacking or being attacked. Indeed, if one may judge from the present system of port regulations in France, the amicable disposition of that country seems to be in its wane; but that the conciliating spirit remains in full force here in England cannot be denied. Every state has, without doubt, a right to regulate the trade and use of its own ports; and treaties should be religiously observed, as long as the observation of them is strictly and honestly mutual. But if there be any just cause of complaint or reasonable suspicion on our part; any strong marks of capitious delay in our negotiations or of designs of further aggrandizement on the part of France; be it remembered by our ministry, that all our conquests are not yet surrendered; and that it would be no breach of faith to retain them until every thing that relates to the letter and spirit of the definitive treaty, every thing that was publicly or privately promised, shall be fully performed.

Tyro.

TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD HAWKESBURY,
His Majesty's Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs.

My Lord,—I shall now endeavour to pursue, a little more in detail, the heads of observation, which were touched upon in my last letter, respecting the subversion of the Germanic body.

1. *The breaking to pieces of the established ascendancy of the House of Austria.*—There

were *eight* voices in the election of an emperor, out of which number were *three* ecclesiastical electors: there will now be only *one* ecclesiastical elector out of *nine*; and, as your lordship will perceive from the very concise and correct statement of my correspondent Agricola (page 295), there will be a fearful majority of protestants in the electoral college. The Elector of Saxony is, indeed, himself a catholic, and the Elector of Hanover, though a protestant, is bound, by the terms of his creation, to vote for the House of Austria; but, the subjects of the former are protestants, and the territories of both these electors are, by the new division, placed as a pledge in the hands of Prussia. The Elector of Bavaria, who is another of the catholic electors, has long been the enemy of Austria, and must now be so from the combined and powerful motives of interest, of rancour, and of fear. So that, out of nine electors, there will be but two, at most, decidedly in favour of the present reigning house; and, it is by no means improbable, that, at another election, the imperial crown may be transferred from the constant friend and faithful ally of England, to a vassal of France.

I am aware, my lord, that, on this topic, an attempt will be made to disguise our danger and disgrace under the affectation of religious joy; and, that fanaticism, coming to the aid of political poltroonerie, will exult at the approaching triumph of the *protestant faith*. A notion like this, my lord, might be excused in the saints of New-England, who formerly hanged the quakers for witchcraft, and who lately celebrated Buonaparté's expulsion of the pope, as "the final extirpation of anti-christ:" nor should I be much surprized or offended, at seeing it openly avowed by the Wilberforces and the Hills; but, I do hope, that no British statesman, that no man who has either talents, wisdom, or spirit, will ever lend his voice to echo such miserable cant.

The constitution of Germany, settled by the treaty of Westphalia, having grown out of disputes that arose at the period of the reformation, when religion and politics, in the empire, naturally borrowed a strong and deep tincture from each other, the names of *Catholics* and *Protestants* are the necessary designations of the opposite interests, though all religious animosity had now happily subsided. Indeed, even while it existed, foreign powers considered them but as political parties. Thus, the kings of France, while they affected extraordinary zeal for the catholic religion, and persecuted their

own protestant subjects most severely, yet were the great supporters of the protestants in Germany. Nay, the popes themselves, in order to divert the attention of the House of Austria from Italy, threw indirect obstacles in the way of the catholic cause in the German states; while, on the other hand, England, from the moment that the House of Austria was weakened, and France comparatively aggrandized, on the continent, declined taking any leading and active part in favour of the German protestants, though she countenanced them in obtaining full liberty of conscience. Our principal efforts, with respect to Germany, have long been wisely directed to unite the empire (protestants with catholics), under our great ally the House of Austria, into a strong defensive confederacy against France. If any thing can be likely ever again to excite religious troubles in Germany, it is the very subversion of rank, of titles, and of property, which has now taken place; it is the demolition of the different archbishoprics, bishoprics, chapters, abbeys, and convents; it is the abolition of the charters of so many free cities, and the reducing of independent noblemen to be the subjects of those, with whom they have heretofore been constitutionally equal as feudatories of the empire; it is the making of those whom we may call the great and opulent freeholders, no more than copyholders under the local lords, who have the power of doing as they please; and all this done, too, at the dictation of a foreign power;—if, in short, religious animosities should again distract and lacerate the empire, it will not be owing to any natural hostility between either the opinions or the interests of protestants and catholics, but to this shifting of the *internal balance* of the empire from one side to the other, which will, at least, and, in the nature of things, must, give birth to much political intrigue and cabal, so as to keep the several members of the empire much more jealous and irritated against each other than against France, who, on the contrary, will naturally be courted, for their own ends, as well as dreaded for her power, by them all.

2. *The removal of the great military power, Austria, from all contiguity with France.*—On this subject the honest Talleyrand observes, with that candour for which he is so remarkable, that the great object of the interfering powers was “to diminish the chances of war;” and, says he (see p. 259), “on this account, care has been taken to avoid all contiguity of territory between the two powers, who have most fre-

quently involved Europe in bloodshed by their quarrels.” This sounds well; but, unfortunately for the sincerity of the honest Talleyrand, and still more unfortunately for Europe, the countries between the Emperor and France are evidently intended to serve as a defence to the latter only; and this point is secured so effectually, that even the Brisgaw seemed too considerable to remain in any prince of the imperial family. It is transferred to a prince, who must, from his local situation and weakness, be wholly dependant upon France. Indeed, it has been made an avowed principle of the new arrangements, to fortify the whole Circle of Suabia as a barrier to France against the great German powers, by interposing weaker powers; who, for their own safety, must, if required, adhere to France for offensive purposes, or may, as occasion suits, cover her with the shield of a *pretended neutrality*. This policy, however, in this quarter, is but a part of the same system uniformly put into execution, from one side of the continent to the other: hence the Italian Republic, the Batavian Republic, the Helvetic Republic, the Ligurian Republic, are allowed a sort of nominal independence; and hence the new Republic of the Valais, with the right, reserved to France exclusively, of a military road through it, which will occupy a considerable portion of its territory, and which leads directly to the new Austrian frontier. Austria will thus, in a manner, be shut out from the system of Europe. She will have no direction, in which her ambition can operate this way. She can look for increased power and consequence on the side of Turkey only; and, we must not be surprised, if, as a boon for the total abandonment of England, she should, at no very distant day, receive from the hands of France, a share in the division of that tottering empire.

3. *Prussia also, lest, by any unforeseen accident, she should become the open and active enemy of France, is also cut off from all approach towards her.*—“The same principle,” says the honest Talleyrand, “adopted, not in all its rigour, but as far as circumstances could admit, has also led to place the indemnities of Prussia beyond the reach of contact with France and Batavia.” If the British ministry were not become mere cyphers in the great transactions of the world; if they were not shut out, with marked and merited contempt, from the cabinets of Europe, your lordship might have puzzled the honest Talleyrand upon this subject. You might have asked him,

why he was so anxious to interpose a barrier between Prussia and the *Batavian Republic*? and, if such interposition were necessary, why no barrier was placed between that independent republic and France?—The impudent frauds of these people are to be equalled only by the ignorance and cowardice of those, on whom those frauds are practised.

Prussia is, by this new partition of territory, so placed as to be worked upon equally by her hopes and fears. Her fears of Russia, fears long since felt and declared even by the Great Frederick himself; and her hopes of Hanover and Osnaburg, which, shut up as they are in the midst of her territories, she will never cease desiring till she obtains, but which France herself, as an additional surety for the submission of England, will, for some time, at least, withhold from the talons of the Black Eagle. Thus situated, there can never be any real cordiality between the electorate of Hanover and the court of Berlin. The political views, too, of the House of Brandenburg, which are known to aspire to the imperial crown, will always keep Prussia subservient to France, and, consequently, still farther disconnected from Great Britain, on account of the influence which the former will certainly have in the electoral college, and the restriction imposed on the small remaining influence of the latter, by the conditions annexed to the vote of Hanover.

4. *As to Russia.*—That power is, by the new arrangement, brought forward into the system of Europe, on the continent; but in complete subordination to the ambition of France. She will always be a most powerful friend to the latter against either Austria or Prussia, because she lies at the back of both, and has many causes of natural quarrel with both, but a comparatively weak enemy against France, because, from her local situation, she can never support large armies to act against France for a continuance of repeated campaigns. But, what has certainly not been the weakest motive with Buonaparté for this measure, so flattering to the views of Russia, is the desire to injure the permanent interests of Great Britain; to secure every means of facility to the French, and to take away every means of advantage that has hitherto existed to the English commerce; and, above all, to revive the spirit, at least, of the hostile northern confederacy, thereby laying the foundation for a rupture between England and Russia, or providing the certain means of rendering the naval superiority of the

former perfectly useless, if she should ever make another effort to resist the hostility of France.

5. *The exaltation of the family of Baden.*—That the favours bestowed on this house and on that of Wirtemberg are, in some measure, to be regarded as a sop to Russia is evident; but it must, at the same time, be acknowledged, that the electoral dignity which has been conferred on the house of Baden, and the grant of territories to that house, confessedly beyond any measure of compensation for losses, have been declaredly bestowed as a reward for good-will towards the Republic of France! What a splendid example to catch all the inferior princes of Germany, to insure their non-resistance and even their active assistance, in case of another war? Those princes will not fail to compare this liberality towards the Margrave of Baden with the tardy and grudging compensation to the head of the house of Orange, mixed up, as I have before noticed, with every species of insult to this country, and, after all, in real value, not worth a tithe, no nor a twentieth, of the loss which he suffered for the attachment to the ancient politics of his ancestors and the alliance of Great Britain, and for which loss your lordship boasted of having obtained compensation by the treaty of Amiens.* To estimate the future effects of this contrast on the political character of Great Britain and France is a task by no means difficult, and the result, though it would, doubtless, produce little effect on the heart of a king-killing representative, or on the linsey-woolsey minds of his constituents, must inevitably

* At the very moment that I was finishing this sentence, the TRUE BRITON of this very day, containing a continuation of a something called a "View of Public Affairs," was put into my hands. The first words (for they are the first in the paper) which I cast my eyes on were the following:—"The opponents of the peace had complained that the preliminaries contained nothing relative to the Prince of Orange; and, determined to find fault, are dissatisfied with what the definitive treaty stipulates on that point. It is, however, evident that the article which guarantees the compensations to the house of Nassau, imports that they shall be perfectly equivalent to what it had lost."—One may easily perceive how this has happened: Sir Frederick Morton Eden, or Mr. Chalmers, or whoever else has been engaged to supply that miscellany of dulness, the True Briton, with this defence of the present ministers, having gone out of town before the declaration of France and Russia was announced to the public, and having left the manuscript with poor HENRIOT, he has committed a blunder something like that of Sir Martin Mar-all, who kept wagging his lips after the song was at an end.

excite, in every loyal and enlightened Briton, reflections the most humiliating, and apprehensions the most fearful. The cause of monarchy has suffered infinitely more from the folly and pusillanimity of monarchical ministers, than from the cunning and violence of its open enemies; and amongst all the political sins, of which the former have been guilty, the most odious as well as the most dangerous, is the abandoning, the basely sacrificing, of their most zealous and most faithful adherents; while the republicains, in the midst of all their robberies, their murders, their treasons and their blasphemies, have invariably, cost what it would, yielded to their partizans, in every quarter of the world, an honourable and efficient protection.—The Margrave of Baden, my lord, will be, to the princes of Germany, an example not less memorable or less powerful than that which Napper Tandy presents to the patriots of Ireland. Both will look to France as the only protecting and remunerating power; both will pay their court to her, and, whenever she chooses to accept of them, both will range themselves under her banners.

Having thus endeavoured to explain the nature and the general tendency of the new division of the Empire, I shall conclude by an attempt to shew, more fully than I have hitherto done, in what manner, and to what degree, England in particular is concerned in the question. This interesting topic must, however, be deferred till my next.—In the mean time, I am, my lord, yours, &c. &c.
London, Sept. 29, 1802. WM. COBBETT.

TO THE EDITOR.

Without pretending, Sir, to be as well acquainted with the affairs of Germany as Agricola, your "intelligent correspondent," as you call him, and as I also acknowledge him to be, permit me to present you with a few observations on his letter. (See p. 295). The situation of Germany a short time previous to the present era, and that to which it has lately been reduced, are, certainly, well portrayed by your correspondent; but it appears to me, at first sight, that his hypothesis "it would be necessary to know, " &c." and afterwards his "plan of conduct for Austria," naturally gives rise to two reflections.

Are we not, Sir, sufficiently acquainted with the state of Austria, by what has happened during the last three years, by the engagements she has entered into in the treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville, and by what she has published relative to

them herself, to discover the line of conduct she will pursue? And how, upon these principles, and others of which I shall presently speak, could your correspondent, for a moment, think it possible, that she should adopt the plan he has laid down; which would otherwise not only be a noble line of conduct, but, at the same time, wise for the present moment, and advantageous in future? It is easy to discover that he is one of our own countrymen; such an idea would never have entered into the mind of a German; so great a degree of disinterestedness is no longer to be found on the Continent. *We* have given up all our conquests for peace, and renounced our influence in the affairs of Europe for—that abundance of which our funds are the barometer; but cross the channel, and you will not persuade any one, that we ought not to seize what is in our power, or, at least, that we ought to refuse accepting something in exchange for what we have lost, however small a proportion it might be of that loss. You will tell me, with Agricola, that even were the Grand Duke of Tuscany fully indemnified in Germany, which he certainly never will be, Austria, considering the portions of her adversaries, not to mention all the other considerations of prudence, of influence, of security, of dignity, of fidelity, &c. &c. would lose more by it, than by following the plan of your correspondent. But the politicians of the present day have no idea of this, it is Greek to them, they enter not into these refinements; it might do very well for our ancestors, but now, every thing is simplified, and we have only, as you well expressed it, *to learn what is the will of Buonaparté*, and you have very justly added, *that that is not always very easy to learn*; for according to the declaration of Austria at Ratisbon, Talleyrand himself, if he is to be believed, did not know it, or, at least, did not well understand it, when he assured Count Cobenzel, *that it was by no means intended to impose a plan upon the empire*. Imposed upon it, he certainly has in one sense or other. To this science of divination, which will, in future, constitute a necessary requisite, and the maximum of the talents of our ministers, we must add for those of the continent, that thirst after those petty ephemeral advantages, which we find among petty jew merchants; and we may also establish it as a fact, that they share with our ministers, that improvidence, which so happily lulls them asleep from day to day.

I must myself confess, that purely and simply contemplating the progress of the

troops, the declarations of Austria, and the insolent provocations of Bavaria and her adherents, and further, the manner in which Austria has more than once extricated herself from situations which were almost desperate, and, lastly, what is passing under her eye in Switzerland, and which might collect like a snow-ball, I have myself been tempted to believe the *possibility* of a resistance to the will of the man from whom every thing emanates; but Lauriston, still proud of the triumph he gained in London, will, no doubt, by his appearance, have calmed the fury of the rising storm.

I will not pretend, Sir, to set myself up for a defender of the philosophical and philanthropical *ideas* with which you reproach the Archduke Charles, with paralyzing the resentments of the House of Austria; notwithstanding my respect for the laurels he has gained, I could not congratulate him much on the olive branches he has added to them, by the part he may have taken in the convention of Leoben, upon which the treaty of Campo Formio has been grafted, nor for the influence it has had on the treaty of Luneville; but whatever our opinion, Sir, may be on this subject, would you venture to advise this prince to involve his country in a war in which it would have to struggle alone, and without the co-operation of England, against the whole of Europe? for, excepting this country and European Turkey, do not Buonaparté himself and his new allies, absolutely give law to that part of the globe? We do not yet know to what generals the Archduke would wish to see the Austrian armies entrusted, should his own health prevent him from taking the command, although we cannot doubt but an army of 300,000 men must contain several; but as before a gun is fired it must be pointed, even supposing this prince should appear at the head of the army, is it from the present minister, or is it from the same hand that signed the treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville, that we can expect such a measure? And being unable to rely on our active co-operation in the war, how will Austria avert the storm which is ready to burst over her? Would the Hawkesburies, the Addingtons, the Cobenzels, the St. Helens, protect her from its fury? It is true there is a remedy for every thing, and that a great genius often produces great effects with small means; that Maria Theresa and Frederick the Second have successively astonished the world by their superior courage under still greater reverses, and which was crowned

with merited success; but now it cannot be concealed, that it is only at the Tuilleries we must seek, or expect to find, grandeur of conception, boldness, foresight in forming plans, unshaken constancy in pursuing the object in view, and that alone, wisdom and prudence in the choice of means, and firmness, activity, and perseverance in its execution. My hatred towards our enemies is in proportion to the superiority of their talents over those which direct the steps of us and our allies; it is equalled only by my admiration for their address, and my indignation at our want of it.

Believe me, Sir, it is not to you that I address this language; but let our *safe politicians* keep their eyes open to what is about to befall us. Since the conclusion of peace, the Corsican has not lost a single day in the great work of effecting our destruction, and he is preparing, not with any mighty effort, but with unwearied assiduity, the completion of this work. We shall console ourselves, indeed, for we console ourselves for every thing—for the navigation of the Black Sea being granted to the French, because we are to participate in the same favor with the invaders of Egypt, the evacuation of which the Turks no longer think they owe to us, from the day when we made it an article of the treaty of peace. But let us not forget that France is henceforward far more exclusively than ever nearer to the Black Sea than ourselves; that she is mistress of Italy, and will be so of Malta; that by this concession of the Porte she gains a new opportunity of attacking from behind; that if she is on terms of amity with Russia, she may now assist her in partitioning the Ottoman Empire, or even without this, in threatening our East-India possessions and our commerce; that if Russia, who till now had nothing to fear from France, and who has so blindly concurred in her aggrandizement, should ever conceive an idea of separating from her, she will herself henceforward be exposed to attacks in a very vulnerable part, a part that is very weak against any enemy whatever, except the Turks—I mean the Crimea; and that what Buonaparté could hitherto obtain from the Emperor, only by the illusive advantages offered to the relations on the female side, he will henceforward extort by menaces and terror. And yet what have been called the ravings of Mr. Windham, and which it has been attempted to turn into ridicule, contained nothing of this kind! The events that have taken place since his speech, and since that of Lord

Grenville, and the events which the least discerning politicians may now easily anticipate as about to happen, far surpass the fears expressed by these two statesmen— But as Cassandra prophesied in vain, I will not assume her name, nor that of Jonas, but subscribe myself. *Caractacus.*

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Ratisbon, Sept. 15—An unexpected incident has occurred respecting the indemnities. The Imperial Plenipotentiary, M. de Hugel, has formally refused to ratify the *conclusum* of the Deputation of the 8th inst. for the adoption of the plan proposed by France and Russia. This refusal has been notified to the Deputation, who held yesterday its fourth sitting, when a very warm discussion took place, and several very important declarations were made. The vote of the Count de Goertz, the Minister of Brandenburg, was particularly remarked: after solemnly protesting against the proceedings of the Imperial Plenipotentiary, and in general against all further adjournment, he demanded that the Deputation should regulate entirely and definitively the indemnities with the Ministers of France and Russia, without the co-operation of the Plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majesty. The sub-delegate of Bavaria voted shortly afterwards to the same effect. The result of this sitting has been an address to the Plenipotentiary, inviting him in the most pressing manner to accede to the *conclusum* of the 8th of September.—M. de Hugel notified his declaration in the form of a decree of the Imperial commission, which is contrary to received usage, and the laws of the empire. He founds his refusal principally upon the adoption of the plan of indemnities being contrary to the dispositions contained in the *conclusum*, by which the Deputation engages to have regard to the reclamations transmitted to it by the parties interested. He offers, as to any thing further, to communicate all the reclamations which shall be addressed to him, to the Ministers of the two mediating Powers, and to enter with them into a conference upon the subject.—In the same sitting of yesterday, the Directorial Minister of Mayence communicated to the Deputation two notes, which are said to be very important, from Citizen Laforêt and the Baron de Buhler, but their contents have not transpired. They are said to be very energetic.—(*Moniteur.*)

Berne, Sept. 16.—We learn from Basil, that an insurrection has broken out there. It was occasioned in the following manner:

There had for some time subsisted a considerable degree of jealousy between the armed citizens and the regular troops of the Canton. A party of the former, encouraged, no doubt, by recent events, assembled suddenly, disarmed the battalion of soldiers, and nearly assassinated the commandant, Citizen Buxtorf. They afterwards took possession of the arsenal and the town-house. The soldiers who were disarmed have been sent home, and the gates of Basil have been kept shut for two days. A subscription has been entered into, and 500,000 livres have been collected and sent to the chiefs of the insurrection in the smaller cantons. Persons who have lately arrived from Zurich, circulated some alarming accounts, which we do not think entitled to entire credit.—They state, that the suspension of arms agreed upon between General Andermatt and the inhabitants of Zurich were suddenly violated by the latter, who made an unexpected sortie from the city, and at first succeeded in repulsing the Helvetic troops, but at length the citizens were driven back into the city, with the loss of 200 men. That after this event General Andermatt had bombarded the city a second time, and had entered it as conqueror, but that fortune had once more changed sides—the inhabitants rose upon the Helvetic troops, defeated them, made General Andermatt prisoner, and cut off his head. These reports, though they do not obtain entire credit, yet cause a great deal of disquietude.—*Sept. 17.*—Our troubles assume a more threatening aspect. The government every day loses its partisans. The hostile measures employed against Zurich have alienated the minds of the inhabitants of several cantons who have not hitherto taken any part. The deputies of the smaller cantons have threatened a rupture of the armistice, on learning the re-commencement of the bombardment at Zurich. The strong castle of Arbourg has surrendered to the insurgents in Argovia. Fear, trouble, and anarchy every where prevail.

Basil, Sept. 17.—We have not yet received any positive information respecting the events which are said to have lately happened at Zurich. The armistice concluded by General Andermatt and the smaller cantons, has enabled him to collect all his forces near that city; they amount to about 3000 men. In the negotiation between the General and the Municipality of Zurich, the former proposed the following terms:—1st. The disarming of the citizens.—2d. That the inhabitants of Zurich should

make good all the expenses which the Helvetic republic had been put to in consequence of their insurrection.—3d. That certain persons who were chiefs in the insurrection should be given up.—The deputies from the city agreed to the two former propositions, but refused to submit to the last. The negotiations were then broken off, and the town was bombarded; but in consequence of an insurrection in the canton of Baden, General Andermatt was obliged to raise the blockade of Zurich. An insurrection broke out in the neighbourhood of Lucerne, but the chiefs having been taken, the peasants soon dispersed.

We are assured that the Prussian ambassador at Paris has announced to the Helvetic Minister there, that his Prussian Majesty has recognized the present Helvetic constitution and government.

Vienna, Sept. 11.—The capitulation made between the Sublime Porte and the famous Passwan Oglou has been actually signed. The Pacha, as might be expected, has obtained a complete amnesty for all past offences, and has even been assured by his government of payment of the arrears due to his troops. On his part, Passwan engages to remain perfectly obedient, and moreover to disband his troops immediately on their receiving the money due to them. It is not very probable, however, that this celebrated rebel, who has exercised pillage during so many years, and who has been the sovereign of one of the provinces of the Turkish empire, will consent to deprive himself of his forces, when he may obtain new means of supporting them on an imposing footing. The peace which prevails at this moment throughout Europe, furnishes, it is true, to the Sublime Porte the means of attacking the rebels in its states, but Passwan Oglou has already evinced, that he knows how to maintain his power either in peace or war, being assured of the neutrality of the neighbouring powers.

Florence, Sept. 8—Our Sovereigns and the Prince Charles Louis set off from this city on the morning of the 4th, with a suite of about eighty persons, and a numerous guard. The King has been detained at Pisa by a slight indisposition, but it is hoped that in two or three days he will be able to continue his journey to Leghorn, to embark on board the squadron which is to convey the Royal Family to Spain.

DOMESTIC OCCURRENCES.

His Majesty's acceptance of the offer of service from the Wiltshire Yeomanry Ca-

valry, has been signified in the following letter from the Secretary of State to the Lord Lieutenant, dated Aug. 31, 1802.—

"My Lord, I have received and laid before the King your Lordship's letter of the 20th instant, containing the offer of the Wiltshire regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry to continue its services, according to the provision of the Act of the last Session of Parliament; and I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve and accept this offer." Signed Hobart, and addressed to the Earl of Pembroke.

At a meeting of the Committee of Ship-Owners, for the port of London, held the 9th day of September, 1802, at Wills' Coffee-house, Cornhill:—present, Mr. Hill in the chair; Mr. Blacket, Mr. Gillespy, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Akenhead, Mr. John Jackson, Mr. Williams, Mr. W. Curling, Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Davison, Mr. Fairles.—The secretary reported, that he had written to Mr. Wells, chairman of the committee of ship-builders, according to the resolution of the last meeting, but that he had not received any answer from him.—The secretary also stated, that he had received letters from G. Smith, Esq. master of the Trinity-house, Leith; Mess. Thomas and Joseph Hillicar, Bristol; and Mr. Michael Longridge, Sunderland; acknowledging the receipt of the several papers which the committee had directed to be sent to them, and expressive of their determination to co-operate with the committee in promoting the various and important objects of this society.—Resolved unanimously, that the thanks of this committee be given to G. Smith, Esq. Leith; Messrs. Thomas and Joseph Hillicar, Bristol; and to Mr. Michael Longridge, Sunderland; for their early attention to the communications addressed to them by the committee.—The committee then took into consideration the letter addressed to the secretary, respecting a Mediterranean pass; which letter being read:—**RESOLVED**, That it be recommended to the parties in question to apply to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to exonerate them from the bond entered into by them, for the Mediterranean pass mentioned in their letter to have been lost under the circumstances therein stated.—**RESOLVED**, That a special general meeting of ship-owners be held at the London Tavern, on Thursday the 30th instant, at twelve o'clock at noon precisely, to take into consideration the draft of a petition to Parliament, for a repeal of the tonnage duty, agreeable to

the resolution of the general meeting of the 22d day of June last, and on other business of importance; and that such general meeting be advertised in the newspapers.—**RESOLVED**, That an extract from the minutes of the proceedings of this committee of the 20th day of May last, including the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th resolutions of the committee at that meeting, be printed and sent to the persons named in the 2d resolution; and also transmitted to the ship-owners at the out-ports.—The draft of a petition to the honourable the House of Commons for the repeal of the tonnage duty was then read by the secretary, and agreed to.—A letter from James Smith, Esq. master of the Trinity-house, Scarborough, respecting a claim made by the directors of Ramsgate Pier, for dues on ships returning in ballast; and on the construction recently given of an Act of Parliament respecting the admeasurement of ships, and the inconvenience resulting from it; and also a letter signed 'A Ship-owner,' which appeared in the Hull Advertiser, on the same subject, were read: but the consideration of them, as well as of the termination of the differences between the ship-builders and their men, was adjourned until the next meeting of the Committee.—**RESOLVED**, That this Committee do adjourn to Thursday the 23d inst.

Signed J. Hill, Chairman.

Fire at Liverpool.—The following is a pretty correct statement of the loss occasioned by this event:

Francis's Warehouse 6 ..	£26,000
Dawson's ditto. 2 ..	8,000
Front row of ditto, belonging to different Persons 3 ..	18,000
<hr/>	
In all 16 Warehouses.	£52,000
Sugar, about 1400 hhds, say	£51,000
Cotton — 1500 bales.	26,000
Coffee and other West-India, &c. produce.	40,000
Grain.	110,000
Tallow, Hemp, &c.	16,000
<hr/>	
	243,000
<hr/>	
	295,000
Insured about.	90,000
<hr/>	
Supposed Loss.	205,000

On the 26th the Lord Mayor, attended by the Aldermen, Mr. Recorder, Mr. Common Serjeant, and City Officers proceeded from the Council Chamber to the hustings, where Messrs. Alexander and Welch were called upon to take upon themselves the office of Sheriffs for the year ensuing, and were sworn into their offices accordingly.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE, 1802.

St. James's, Sept. 22.—This day Sir Charles Morgan, Bart. and John Smith, Esq. were sworn of his Majesty's Most Hon. Privy Council.

Hanover, Sept. 6.—His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge has been pleased to appoint the Rev. George Henry Glass, Master of Arts, Rector of Hanwell, in the county of Middlesex, to be one of His Royal Highness's domestic Chaplains.

Downing Street, Sept. 27.—The King has been pleased to appoint Colonel Prevost to be Capt.-Gen. and Governor in Chief, over his Majesty's Island of Dominica.

War Office, Sept. 25.—1st Reg. of Drag. Lieut. Wright Edward Atkyns to be Capt. of a Troop, by purchase, vice Langford, who retires. Cornet Edward Swainston to be Lieut. vice Atkyns.—20th Reg. of Light Drag. Lewis Gasquet, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Card promoted.—23d Ditto, Capt. William Maxwell to be Major, vice Alexander Maxwell, deceased. Cornet Robert Salmon to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Gordon, promoted in the 60th Foot. Quarter-Master Robert Thomas to be Cornet, vice Salmon.—24th Ditto, Capt. Henry Loftus to be Major, by purchase, vice Verelst, who retires.—York Hussars, Ensign Char. Bellock, from the 85th Foot, to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Henrietta, who retires.—1st Reg. of Foot Guards, Lieut.-Col. Lord Charles Bentinck, from the 38th Foot, to be Capt. of a Company, vice Coleman, who exchanges.—Coldstream Reg. of Foot Guards, Lieut.-Col. William Henry Pringle, from the 4th Foot, to be Capt. of a Company, vice the Earl of Cork, who exchanges.—3d Reg. of Foot Guards, Capt. George Henry Duffield to be Capt. of a Company, by purchase, vice Shaw, who retires.—2d Battal. of the 1st Reg. of Foot, Capt. James Stevenson Barnes to be Major, by purchase, vice Macdonald, who retires.—4th Reg. of Foot, Colonel Edmund Earl of Cork, from the Coldstream Reg. of Foot Guards, to be Lieut.-Col. vice Pringle, who exchanges.—12th Ditto, Ensign Henry Hardy to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Page who retires.—22d Ditto, Lieut. Duncan Campbell, from the 91st Foot, to be Lieut. vice Kirby, placed on Half-pay. Lieut. Francis Lodge Morris, from Half-pay of the 46th Foot, to be Lieut., vice West, placed on Half-pay.—32d Ditto, Assistant-Surgeon W. Hackett, from Half-pay of the 15th Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon.—35th Ditto, Major Charles Strickland, to be Lieut.-Col. by purchase, vice Baylis.—37th Ditto, Ensign Samuel Busby to be Lieut. by purchase, vice Medley, who retires.—38th Ditto, Lieut.-Col. Francis John Colman, from the 1st Foot Guards, to be Lieut.-Col. vice Lord Charles Bentinck, who exchanges. Lieut. John Every, from Half-pay of the 15th Light Drag. to be Lieut. vice Newton, who exchanges, receiving the difference.—44th Ditto, Lieut. Francis Henry Borell, from Half-pay, to be Lieut. vice Fernandez, who exchanges, receiving the difference.—53d Ditto, Brevet Lieut.-Col. Hampson, P. Thomas, from the 64th Foot, to be Capt. vice Deane, who exchanges.—55th Ditto, Lieut. William Ellice, from Half-pay, of the 6th Foot, to be Lieut. vice Greer, who exchanges, receiving the difference.—60th Reg. of Foot, Charles Maximilian St. Paul, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Cartwright, promoted.—62d Ditto, Lieut. Samuel Denholm Young, Gent. to be Captain, by purchase, vice O'Meara, who retires.—64th Ditto, Capt. Tho. Deane, from the 53d Foot to be Captain, vice

Thomas, who exchanges.—65th Ditto, Capt. John Swinton, from Half-pay of the 4th Foot, to be Capt. vice Lefroy, who exchanges, receiving the difference.—67th Ditto, Lieut. Alexander Pilford to be Capt.-Lieut. by purchase, vice O'Bryen, promoted.—70th Ditto, William Keon, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Firth, who retires.—72d Ditto, Capt.-Lieut. Lawrence Oliphant to be Capt. of a Company, vice Fraser, deceased. Lieut. Thomas White to be Capt.-Lieut. vice Oliphant Adjut. Edward Renwick, from the Fifeshire Fencibles, to be Adjutant, with the rank of Ensign vice White, who resigns the Adjutancy.—3d West India Reg. Bryan Bernard Kelly Kelly, Esq. to be Paymaster, vice Bent, who resigns.—Queen's German Reg. Capt.-Lieut. William M'Carthy to be Captain of a Company, vice Develin, deceased. Lieut. Matthew Sutton to be Capt.-Lieut. vice M'Carthy.

Garrisons.—The Rev. William Hardwicke to be Chap. to the Garrison of St. John's in Newfoundland, vice Tickell, deceased.—Lieut. Robert Grier, of the 25th Foot, to be Town-Major of Prince Edward's Island, vice Robertson, promoted.

Memorandum.—Supernumerary Major Francis Slater Rebow is appointed Major and Lieut.-Col. in the 2d Reg. of Life Guards, and not Second Major, as stated in the Gazette of October 1, 1799.—Ensign Macdonald, of the 5th Reg. of Foot, and Lieut. Dennis Vernon, of the 23d Foot, are superseded, being absent without leave.

War Office, Sept. 28.—4th Reg. of Drag. Cornet Lord William George Henry Somerset, from Half-pay of the 4th Drag. to be Cornet, vice Faulkner, who exchanges, receiving the difference.—20th Reg. of Light Drag. Cornet Maximilian Joerres, from Hompesch's Mounted Riflemen, to be Corn. vice Campbell, deceased.—Hompesch's Mounted Riflemen, Lieut. James Hughes, from the 60th Foot, to be Capt. by purchase, vice Chollett, who retires.—5th Reg. of Foot, Major Arthur Gore, from the 40th Foot, to be Lieut.-Col. by purchase, vice Gooch, who retires.—13th Ditto, Capt. Tryon Bayard, from Half pay of the 41st Foot, to be Capt. vice Schyler, who exchanges, receiving the difference.—28th Ditto, Assistant-Surgeon A. Williams, from Half-pay of the 4th Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Steward appointed to the Hospital-Staff at Jamaica.—40th Ditto, Lieut. William Balfour to be Capt. by purchase, vice Godfrey, who retires.—47th Ditto, Surgeon Tho. Gunning, from Half-pay of the 4th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Loane, deceased.—69th Ditto, Assistant-Surgeon William Stone, from Half-pay of the Staff-Corps, to be Assistant-Surgeon.—4th West-India Reg. Capt. William Clunes, from Half-pay of the 50th Foot, to be Capt. vice Yates, who exchanges.

Garrisons.—Lieut. Winckworth Tonge, of the Royal Fusiliers, to be Town-Adjutant of Cape Breton, vice Fitzsimons, who resigns.

Hospital Staff.—Surgeon . . . M'Neill, from the 85th Foot, to be Surgeon to the Forces.

BANKRUPTS.

Simkins, Archer Thomas, of Old Swan-lane, Upper Thames-street, London, lighterman and coal-merchant.—Beedzler, John, late of Market-Deeping, Lincolnshire, brazier and corn-merchant.—Farthing, Robert, of Blakeney, Norfolk, merchant.—Fawcett, Thomas, of Chiswell-street, Moorfields, rectifier.—Hughes, John, of Worester, butcher.—Nightingale, George, of Leaden-

hall-street, carver and gilder.—Pope, William, of Wood-street, London, merchant.—Roberts, Edward of Bedford-court, Covent Garden, woollen-draper.—Tomkinson, Richard, Tomkinson, John, and Frederick, Daniel, Solicke, of Liverpool, merchant.—Wilkinson, Robert, and Daniel, George, of Kingston-upon-Hull, merchants.

STOCKS.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THU.	FRI.
3 per C. Con.	69 $\frac{1}{8}$	69	69	—	69 $\frac{3}{8}$	69 $\frac{1}{2}$
5 pr Ct. Ann.	101 $\frac{1}{8}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{4}$	—	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{4}$
Imp. 3 per Ct.	—	68 $\frac{7}{8}$	—	—	68 $\frac{3}{4}$	68 $\frac{7}{8}$
D ^o Ann.	—	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{4}$	—	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{4}$
Omnium . . .	8 dis	8 $\frac{1}{4}$ dis	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ dis	—	8 dis	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

AMSTER. C.F. 11 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2 us.	LEGHORN 51 $\frac{1}{2}$
D ^o , at sight 10 19 $\frac{1}{2}$	NAPLES 43 $\frac{1}{2}$
ROTTERDAM 11 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2 us.	GENOA 47 $\frac{1}{2}$
HAMBURGH 33 5 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ us.	VENICE, 59 livrespiccole
ALTONA 33 6 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ us.	effective per £. ster.
PARIS 1 day 23 11	LISBON 67 $\frac{1}{2}$
PARIS 23 19 2 us.	Oporto 67 $\frac{1}{2}$
BOURDEAUX, 24	DUBLIN 12
CADIZ 36 eff.	BILBOA 86 $\frac{1}{2}$ D ^o
MADRID 31 $\frac{1}{2}$ effective	AGIO, bank on Hol. p.

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q. 45s to 70s	Hops per cwt. 120s to 220s
Rye 30 . . 34	Hay per load . . . 80 . . 150
Barley 31 . . 38	Beef, per stone 4s. to 5s.
Malt 40 . . 52	Mutton 5s. od. to 6s. od.
Oats 14 . . 23	Veal . . . 4s. 6d. to 6s. 4d.
Pease (white) . . . 39 . . 42	Pork . . . 5s. 6d. to 7s. od.
Beans (horse) . . . 35 . . 38	Tallow 3s. 9d.
Flour per sack . . 50 . . 52	Av. of Sugar pr cwt 31s. 9d.
Seconds 45 . . 50	Salt, per Bushel 13s. 10d.
Coals per chal . . . 36 . . 41	Bread 10d the Quar. Loaf.

Days.	M's age	Weather, near Guildford.	Winds. M. A.	Barom. Inch. M. A.	Ther. Deg. M. A.
23		Fine.	E E	29,95 29,95	66 70
24		Fine.	E E	30,01 30,01	59,5 68
25		Fine.	E E	30,2 30,2	60 67
26	●	Fog. Fine.	E E	30,26 30,2	60 65
27		Fair.	NE NE	30,16 30,16	56 59
28		Fair.	NE NE	30,17 30,16	49,5 56
29		Fair.	NE NE	30,23 30,22	56 66,5

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

A report of the vice-president of the Italian republic (which shall have a place in our next) has attracted some attention; but, the more important transactions in Switzerland and in Germany seem, at present, to have engrossed the thoughts of all those who take an interest in public affairs.

The civil war between the smaller cantons and the Helvetic government still rages. Much blood has been shed. French troops have been called in to the aid of government; and, did not Buonaparté perceive a greater advantage in the occasional neutrality of Switzerland, there is no doubt but the whole country would, in the course of a very few weeks, be united to the republic of France, with as little ceremony as Piedmont has been, and with as little fear of exciting the jealousy and the resentment of foreign nations.

At Ratisbon, the scene (as will be perceived by referring to p. 403) is far from being so smooth as it was expected to be. On the 13th Sep. the Baron de Hugel transmitted to the deputation a decree of the imperial commission, which was immediately replied to by the French and Russian ministers. These papers (which will appear in our next) fully prove, that, if the Emperor does, at last, yield to the iniquitous, the imperious and insolent mandates of Russia and France, his submission must be ascribed, not to his want of great, enlightened and honourable views, but to the degradation and imbecility of other nations, particularly this fallen and foolish England. If England had not been in such haste to conclude a peace, of which Buonaparté alone ought to have wished for the conclusion, in order thereby to complete the subjugation of France, of Europe, and of St. Domingo, and to enter on his Spanish and Portuguese cessions; if England had not pressed the accomplishment of the views of her deadly foe, what a prospect would the present moment have offered! Austria burning with rage, a civil war in Switzerland, which, while it covers the weak part of Austria, opens to her the weak part of France. Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany would instantly rise against their task master; all the Catholic part of Germany would declare decidedly for the Emperor. Prussia would not dare to move; and, most assuredly, Russia, under such circumstances, would, notwithstanding the want of the zeal and address of Lord St. Helens, never think of undertaking a war for such an object and with such an ally. The accusation, too, the just accusation, of having, merely for purposes of ambition, plunged France into a new war, at a moment when (whatever may be said to the contrary) a famine, or, at least, an alarming scarcity, is apprehended, could not have failed to excite a formidable opposition against the troubler of the world.—But, such an opportunity, once neglected, never returns. The miserable policy manufactured by the Wilberforces, and, unfortunately, adopted by Mr. Pitt (for it is really a shame to affect to attribute the evil to those who are almost literally no more than tools in his hands) has banished us from the continent of Europe, and, it would require, in this cabinet, such a change of sentiment and of conduct, as, it is to be feared, we never shall behold, to obtain a repeal, or even a mitigation, of the sentence.

On this subject we have just noticed an article in the Morning Chronicle, which appears to be a continuation of that, from which we made a short quotation in our

last, p. 362. The present article we shall insert entire, not only because it is an admirable piece of political writing, and expresses, from one end to the other, in the happiest manner, precisely what we ourselves could have wished to express, but, because, when the former sentiments of the Morning Chronicle are considered, it will serve to show the change produced in the mind of, at least, one part of the public, by the recent alarming transactions in Germany. Those who recollect the sentiments delivered by the noblemen and gentlemen who opposed the peace, and who recollect the censure (not to say abuse) bestowed on those sentiments by the Morning Chronicle, and, indeed, by almost every news-paper in London, must be forcibly struck with the following article, nearly every sentiment of which may be traced to some part or other of the speeches delivered by the opposers of the peace, and particularly to that of Mr. Windham on the preliminaries, which, being printed in the form of a book, may be referred to with the greater facility.

“A few days ago we laid before our readers a faithful view of the decline, or rather absolute extinction of the influence and consideration of Great-Britain upon the continent of Europe. A just sense of that situation, so humiliating to our pride, and which ultimately may be fatal to our safety, [Mr. Windham's Speech, p. 19 and 91.] ought to rouse the people of England to reflect on the real source of the greatness — nay, of the safety of states. We are in danger of becoming the dupes of the wealth of which, with so much ostentation, we perpetually boast. We have contracted the vices of new-gotten inordinate riches; a coarse and vulgar affectation, founded on no better pretence than the weight of the purse, and a disgusting air of superiority to others, with no better qualities to justify it than the habits of accumulation and the practice of gain. However valuable an accessory and instrument commercial wealth may be, it does not constitute the greatness of a nation [Mr. Windham's Speech, p. 21.]

“When we compare the temper and the character of the French government with that of our own, we see room for infinite alarm. We may inveigh with just indignation against the ambition, the perfidy, the injustice of Buonaparté, and dilate with complacency on the meekness and pacific disposition of Mr. Addington.—Till the period, however, arrives when the lamb may lie down in safety with the lion, we shall not be greatly reassured by a comparison of moral qualities. After the in-

“fin
“an
“od
“is
“for
“lit
“[M
“wi
“in
“an
“dir
“vir
“nev
“usu
“if v
“fen
“Co
“
“(a
“we
“nat
“per
“hov
“of
“crit
“pue
“r
“p. 2
“hea
“(as
“don
“spo
“by
“kin
“out
“he i
“sed
“Fra
“and
“lera
“whe
“enti
“dign
“duce
“urge
“ever
“yet
“den
“veig
“flam
“It
“sul d
“ecut
“succ
“trast
“ples
“his a
“tion
“spiri
“ener

“ finite declamations on the wickedness of
 “ ambition, ambition is never thoroughly
 “ odious but when it is unsuccessful. There
 “ is a defect in the moral sense of mankind,
 “ for they never cease to admire great qua-
 “ lities however exerted to dishonest ends,
 “ [Mr. Windham's Speech, p. 100] and it
 “ will be in vain ever to attempt to elevate
 “ innocent imbecility to the rank of a great
 “ and able ravager of the world. Mr. Ad-
 “ dington's weakness, with all the humble
 “ virtue his friends can ingraft upon it, will
 “ never be raised to the level of Buonaparté's
 “ usurped dominions; and woe to England
 “ if we are condemned to lean on such a de-
 “ fence against the enterprises of the First
 “ Consul.

“ Laying aside the office of moral censors
 “ (a function that will serve us little, unless
 “ we can remove Buonaparté from his Se-
 “ nate by our assumed prerogative) it is pro-
 “ per to consider like practical politicians,
 “ how the dignity, honour and independence
 “ of this country are to be maintained in so
 “ critical a state of the world.—It were a
 “ puerility deserving more than contempt to
 “ rely solely on the pacific intentions of the
 “ First Consul. [Mr. Windham's Speech,
 “ p. 29, 31, 39] Indeed it is impossible to
 “ hear Buonaparté insulting our statesmen
 “ (as his own journals report him to have
 “ done), [alluding to the words said to be
 “ spoken to Fox, respecting Mr. Windham]
 “ by inveighing against those who would
 “ kindle the flames of war in Europe, with-
 “ out indignation. At the moment when
 “ he issues from his senate, after having pas-
 “ sed a decree, uniting all Piedmont to
 “ France, and thereby invading the rights
 “ and independence of mankind, it is into-
 “ lerable to be so derided. In happier times,
 “ when the resources of Europe were more
 “ entire, and the tone of its statesmen more
 “ dignified, that annexation would have pro-
 “ duced a new and most just war, [This was
 “ urged, with respect to Elba, &c. &c. by
 “ every gentleman who opposed the peace]
 “ yet (oh incredibilem audaciam, oh impu-
 “ dentiam prædicandam) Buonaparté in-
 “ veighs against those who would kindle the
 “ flames of war in the great family of Europe!
 “ It must be confessed that the First Con-
 “ sul displays a capacity, a vigour, in the ex-
 “ ecution of his designs, that insure their
 “ success, and elevate his character by con-
 “ trast with the imbecility on which he tram-
 “ ples. Glory and dominion are the ends of
 “ his administration. In war and negotia-
 “ tion he displays the same energy, the same
 “ spirit of command. He assails, with equal
 “ energy, with equal daring, by his diplo-

“ macy as by his arms. In both he con-
 “ founds and dismays his adversaries. Their
 “ feeble resistance only adds to the credit of
 “ the success. In every negotiation, in every
 “ pretension, he decides the question in his
 “ own favour, even before discussion. His
 “ opponents may shew a hesitating, timorous
 “ opposition, but their minds being already
 “ subdued, they end with implicit submis-
 “ sion, and their reluctance only proves that
 “ they are compelled.

“ A neighbour, who thus conquers in
 “ peace as well as in war, ought to be op-
 “ posed by a vigour, an energy, a daring in
 “ diplomacy equal to his own. Timid re-
 “ monstrances, torpid discussion, are lost
 “ upon such an adversary. But vigour and
 “ decision are only to be employed by great
 “ abilities, and commanding reputations.—
 “ Weak men may be precipitate and rash.
 “ They can never be vigorous and stout, be-
 “ cause they have no wisdom, no prudence.
 “ They are sure to produce contention;
 “ while the decision of firmness, of genius,
 “ always secures victory. From the cha-
 “ racter of the present administration, in-
 “ deed, it would be in vain to expect acts
 “ of vigour. It would be even dangerous
 “ for them to assume a tone of firmness.
 “ Their talents, their reputation, do not
 “ warrant those bold and decisive steps
 “ which succeed only with superior men.
 “ Knowing this, Buonaparté has, from the
 “ beginning, treated ministers with an air
 “ that bespeaks consciousness of his ascen-
 “ dancy. In every disputed question during
 “ the negotiation, he was ultimately victo-
 “ rious. It may well be remembered, dur-
 “ ing the negotiation at Amiens, what an
 “ appearance of vigour was assumed, what
 “ note of preparation was sounded! The
 “ definitive treaty at length was published,
 “ and in every principle, in every detail, it
 “ was found more advantageous to France
 “ than the preliminary articles. [The very
 “ words of all those who opposed the peace,
 “ as every person who reads the newspapers
 “ must well remember.] With the same
 “ domineering superiority Buonaparté con-
 “ tinues to act towards them. He knows
 “ their want of true firmness, as he knows
 “ their want of real capacity. He cavils,
 “ demands, refuses. He expects a momen-
 “ tary reluctance, an argument in a memo-
 “ rial, but he knows that, by perseverance,
 “ his object will be attained. By this con-
 “ duct with such a ministry, he is perpe-
 “ tually gaining. It is not the rapid con-
 “ quest of arms, but it is a conquest per-
 “ naps more fatal. [Windham's Speech,
 “ p. 24 and 25, where the whole process is

" minutely described.] The habit of dictat-
 " ing on the one hand, and of submitting
 " upon the other, is contracted. The spirit
 " of command, and the spirit of obedience,
 " become the respective attributes of the
 " two countries, and absolute conquest is pre-
 " pared by the utter subjugation of national
 " dignity, and extinction of national pride.

" At a time when such a formidable rival,
 " one never content with acquisition, but in
 " the perpetual act of acquiring more, is
 " presented to us, it would have demanded
 " all the talents, all the reputation com-
 " bined, which this nation possesses, to op-
 " pose his encroaching spirit. It would
 " have required a ministry singularly adapt-
 " ed to the conduct of foreign affairs to
 " have given us weight, and to have given
 " France limits on the continent. Foreign
 " powers ought to have been solicited, and
 " gained over to the general interests of the
 " community. The family of Europe (to
 " use Buonaparté's own phrase) should have
 " been united against the rebellious, unna-
 " tural disposition of one of its members.
 " But IT REQUIRES A GREAT AND COM-
 " MANDING REPUTATION TO GAIN THE
 " CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN POWERS.—
 " ANY MAN, HOWEVER INSIGNIFICANT,
 " MAY SUPPORT A COURT INTRIGUE, OR
 " LEAD A VENAL, SPIRITLESS CREW, WHO
 " ADHERE TO ANY MINISTER; BUT OUT
 " OF THE CIRCLE OF OUR OWN KINGDOM
 " SUCH MEN TRULY FIND THEIR LEVEL.
 " NO FOREIGN COURT, NO CONSENT OF
 " MEN, NO FEELING OF SOCIETY IN DAN-
 " GER AND IN AIMS, CAN RALLY ROUND
 " SUCH HOLIDAY MINISTERS. NO DE-
 " PENDANCE CAN BE PLACED ON THEM."

[This is the very sentiment contained in the
 letter of our Stockholm correspondent, p. 361.]

" Thus, when union is most wanted, union
 " is made impossible. Hence the wonder-
 " ful effect of reputation for the achieve-
 " ment of good; hence the sacred inde-
 " feasible duty of great men guarding their
 " reputation free from reproach, because
 " it is a public property. Foreign powers
 " that would commit themselves to the
 " bark which carries Cæsar, will not trust
 " themselves with a low, obscure, nameless
 " crew. Hence the abandoned state in
 " which we are left naked to our enemies."

To every sentence, phrase, word, any
 syllable, of this extract do we most heartily
 subscribe, and our readers will do us the
 justice to recollect, that, in so doing, we
 strictly adhere to those principles and opi-

nions, which, ever since the signature of
 the peace, it has been our constant endea-
 vour to instil into the minds of the public.
 The last paragraph, particularly, we would
 beg leave to direct the attention of Mr. Pitt.
 While the world remained in its old-fashioned
 state; while England enjoyed the benefit of
 those connexions, which had been formed by
 the wisdom and the valour of our ancestors,
 while we were supported in the world by
 that vast stock of reputation, which they
 had treasured up for us, to conduct the
 affairs of this country required only credit
 at the bank and a majority at St. Stephen's.
 The times are changed. Mr. Pitt, if he
 continues to rule, must look abroad, or the
 ground will slip from beneath him. He
 must discard the politics of the wise-acres
 and the wise-acres themselves, or the mo-
 narchy of England is not of many years du-
 ration. When we contemplate the fallen
 state of this country and the strange situa-
 tion of Mr. Pitt, we are naturally led to in-
 quire, who, or what, has produced this
 wonderful change; and when, at last, we
 trace the mighty mischief to some half do-
 zen canting candidates for popular favour,
 our surprize, our disappointment and indig-
 nation, are like those of the hunter, who, at
 the end of a long and intricate pursuit, finds
 a weazle concealed in the den of the wolf.
 There is one reflection, however, which,
 we must confess, is always somewhat con-
 solatory to us; and that is, that a people,
 who can basely turn their backs on men of
 honour, and yield themselves to the guid-
 ance of these political vermin, deserve every
 species of chastisement that Buonaparté
 and his legions can inflict.

Mr. Coke, member for Norfolk, at a din-
 ner, which he gave at Dereham, told the
 company he had a letter from Charles Fox.
 He then gave them an account of Mr. Fox's
 honourable reception by Buonaparté, and en-
 deavoured to impress them with an opinion,
 that Buonaparté has a strong predilection for
 Mr. Fox, and that, if the latter were Minister,
 England might rely upon the continuance of peace,
 and also upon the friendship of France.—On the
 correctness of this statement, our readers
 may place perfect reliance; and, when they
 have well considered the sort of person that
 Mr. Coke is, the information which Fox
 must have given him, together with the
 motive for giving him that information,
 then let them compare the language of Mr.
 Coke with the opinion stated in the Letter
 to Fox, p. 344 of the Register.